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With the Northeast identified as India’s ‘future powerhouse’ and
at least 168 large hydroelectric projects2  set to majorly alter the
riverscape, large dams are emerging as a major issue of conflict in the
region. Although the current scale of dam-related developments far
outstrips anything which took place in the past, the region has been
no stranger to dam-related conflicts. For example, the Kaptai dam,
built in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh)
in the 1960s, submerged the traditional homelands of the Hajong
and Chakma indigenous communities, and forced them to migrate
into parts of Northeast India. Over the years, this has led to serious
conflicts between the refugees and local communities in Arunachal
Pradesh. In the 1970s, the Gumti dam in Tripura submerged large
tracts of arable land in the Raima Valley and displaced the local tribal
population, leading to unrest. Projects such as the Loktak hydroelectric
project commissioned in the 1980s have impacted the wetland ecology
of the Loktak lake in Manipur, seriously affecting the habitat of the
endangered Sangai (the brow-antlered deer) and the livelihoods of
local people. The impending loss of home, land and livelihood has led
to many years of opposition to the Pagladiya project in Assam and the
Tipaimukh project in Manipur on the Barak river.  More recent times
have seen major conflicts emerge in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh
over the individual and cumulative impacts of over 100 dams planned
in upstream Arunachal. Dam-induced floods from projects such as
the 405 MW Ranganadi hydroelectric project in Arunachal and the
intense people’s opposition to the under-construction 2,000 MW
Lower Subansiri hydroelectric project on the Assam – Arunachal
Pradesh border have been major triggers for what has now emerged as
a major political debate on the downstream impacts of dams in the
region. Meanwhile, in the uplands of Sikkim and Arunachal, minority
indigenous communites such as the Lepchas and Idu Mishmis have
expressed concern about the impacts of multiple mega projects in
their homelands. The large dams’ juggernaut promises to be the biggest
‘development’ intervention in this ecologically and geologically fragile,
seismically active and culturally sensitive region in the coming days.
THE REGION
Northeast India, consisting of the eight states of Assam, Arunachal
Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura and
Sikkim, is known for its biological and cultural diversity and the unique
Brahmaputra and Barak river systems. While the eight states are indeed
collectively referred together as the ‘Northeast’, there is substantial
diversity within the region even as far as political and socio-economic
issues are concerned, both historically and in contemporary times.
The region is rich in biodiversity and is home to important
populations of wildlife species such as the rhino, elephant, tiger, wild
water buffalo, pygmy hog and gangetic river dolphin. Three out of
34 biodiversity hotspots identified globally3  – Himalaya, Indo-Burma,
and Western Ghats and Sri Lanka – cover parts of India.  The Northeast
is traversed by the first two and in 8% of the country’s geographical
area it also houses 21% of Important Bird Areas within India, identified
as per international criteria. It is an area which is still poorly documented
and in recent years biologists have discovered new species and extended
known ranges of existing ones in the region.  This is not just restricted
to smaller life forms, but also large mammals such as primates, discovery
of which is rare these days, an indication of how unexplored the
region is. The Northeast also has a high level of endemism (plant and
animal species found nowhere else).
The Brahmaputra4  is one of the world’s largest rivers, with a
drainage basin of 580,000 sq km, 33% of which is in India. Originating
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Biodiversity-rich ecosystems on the Assam-Arunachal Pradesh border will be negatively
impacted by the under-construction 2000 MW Lower Subansiri hydroelectric project.
The altered flow patterns in the Brahmaputra and its tributaries due to multiple large dams
will have a substantial impact on fisheries and livelihoods in the Brahmaputra valley.
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Damming Northeast India2
in the great glacier mass of Chema-Yung-Dung
in the Kailas range of southern Tibet at an
elevation of 5,300 m, it traverses 1,625 km
through Chinese territory and 918 km in India,
before a final stretch of 337 km through
Bangladesh, emptying into the Bay of Bengal
through a joint channel with the Ganga. A
unique river, it drains such diverse environments
as the cold dry plateau of Tibet, the rain-drenched
Himalayan slopes, the landlocked alluvial plains
of Assam and the vast deltaic lowlands of
Bangladesh. An extremely dominant monsoon
interacting with a unique physiographic setting,
fragile geological base and active seismo-tectonic
instability, together with anthropogenic factors,
have moulded the Brahmaputra into one of the
world’s most intriguing and gigantic river systems.
The dramatic reduction in the slope of the
Brahmaputra as it cascades through one of the
world’s deepest gorges in the Himalayas before
flowing into the Assam plains explains the sudden
dissipation of the enormous energy locked in it
and the resultant unloading of large amounts of sediments in the
valley downstream. The river carries the second largest sediment yield
in the world, while it ranks fourth in terms of water discharge.
In the course of its 2,880 km journey to the Bay of Bengal, the
Brahmaputra receives as many as 22 major tributaries in Tibet, 33 in
India and three in Bangladesh. Many of the north bank tributaries are
of Himalayan origin, fed by glaciers in their upper reaches, e.g. the
Subansiri, the Jia Bharali (Kameng),  and the Manas. The Dibang and
the Lohit are two large tributaries emerging from the extreme eastern
flank of the Himalayas, while the Jiadhal, the Ranganadi, the Puthimari,
and the Pagladiya are some of the major tributaries with sources in the
sub-Himalayas, the latter two in Bhutan. The river system is intricately
linked with the floodplain ecology of wetlands (beels) and grasslands
in the Brahmaputra valley. For example, these linkages are evident in
the world-renowned ecosystems such as the Kaziranga National Park
in Assam. Due to the colliding Eurasian (Chinese) and Indian tectonic
plates, the Brahmaputra valley and its adjoining hill ranges are
seismically very unstable and the region has seen some major
earthquakes (see box on Dams & Environmental Risks).
The other major river basin in Northeast India is the Barak. This
river has its source in Manipur and the upper Barak catchment area
extends over almost the entire north, northwestern, western and
southwestern portion of the state. The middle course of the river lies
in the plains of Cachar in southern Assam, while the lower, deltaic
course is in Bangladesh. Both the Brahmaputra and the Barak river
systems are also the lifeline for livelihoods such as fishing and agriculture
of local communities in their respective floodplains.
The region is home to a diversity of indigenous communities,
with a substantial portion of the population dependent on natural
resource-based livelihoods. This diversity of communities comes with
unique socio-cultural, agro-ecological and land-holding systems (such
as different forms of community control over forests in various parts of
the region). By the late 19th century, tea and other business had
brought massive demographic and economic change to undivided
Assam. But the experience was varied across the region. For example,
the area that would later become Arunachal Pradesh was relatively
isolated from such changes. In 1875, the British established the ‘inner
line’ - a demarcation between the Assamese plains and the mountains
through which nobody could pass without a permit.5  This restriction
and the geography of the region kept Arunachal Pradesh isolated
from upheavals, such as conversion of massive stretches of land into
privately owned tea gardens, seen in Assam.
The region, today, is marked by socio-political complexities, which
include struggles for political autonomy and associated armed conflicts.
The Indian constitution has attempted to deal with the northeast’s
unique nature by establishing a system of administration that differs
from the rest of the country. The Sixth Schedule and other
constitutional provisions relevant to the Northeast offer different
degrees of autonomy and self-management (including natural resource
management) to indigenous communities. Despite this, there seems
to be little opportunity for them for participation in decisions related
to large developmental projects. Faced with a multitude of challenges,
the region is currently charting a course for ‘development’, and multiple
large hydel projects for power export are a part of the government’s
official development plan.
The fragile ecology of the Loktak lake and livelihoods of those dependent on it have been seriously impacted by
the Loktak hydroelectric project in Manipur. Lessons must be learnt from such cases before embarking on massive
dam expansion plans in the Northeast.
Northeastern wildlife biologists have raised concern about the impact of multiple
hydropower projects in the Brahmaputra basin on the national aquatic animal, the
gangetic river dolphin.
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3Damming Northeast India
NORTHEAST POWER SURGE
In 2001, the Central Electricity Authority (CEA) did a preliminary
ranking study of the hydroelectric potential of various river basins in
the country. The Brahmaputra basin was given the highest ‘marks’
and 168 projects with a total installed capacity of 63,328 MW were
identified.  The tag of being the country’s ‘future powerhouse’ has
been proactively used for the region since the Northeast Business
Summit in Mumbai in July 2002. The 50,000 MW Hydro Initiative
launched by the Ministry of Power in 2003 also has a major focus on
the Northeast. The  ‘Pasighat Proclamation on Power’ adopted in
January 2007 at the North East Council’s Sectoral Summit on the
Power Sector identifies the region’s hydropower potential as one of the
priority areas to contribute to the country’s energy security.
The push for large hydropower projects in the Northeast was
primarily a process driven by the Central Government till the gradual
liberalisation of hydropower policies allowed  states to invite private
players. While Sikkim kick-started this process in the Northeast in
2001-2, the process gathered momentum across the region in 2005.
Although states such as Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim are at the
forefront in the initiative to sign multiple Memoranda of
Understanding/Agreement (MoU/MoA) with power developers,
other states such as Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland
have seen some action too. Assam and Tripura are smaller players in
hydropower because of their topography. In May 2008, the then
Union Minister of State for Power, Jairam Ramesh, raised concern
about the ‘MoU virus’ which was affecting states like Arunachal
Pradesh and Sikkim. He was referring to the very rapid pace at which
agreements (MoUs/MoAs) were being signed by these State
Governments with hydropower companies, particularly in the private
sector. Till October 2010, the government of Arunachal Pradesh has
already allotted 132 projects to companies in the private and public
sector for a total installed capacity of 40,140.5 MW, with around 120
of these projects having an involvement of private players.  Each of
these agreements have been accompanied by huge monetary advances
taken from project developers at the time of inking the deal, before
any public consultations, preparation of Detailed Project Reports and
receipt of mandatory clearances!
This kind of process of signing MoUs, where monetary advances
are paid upfront, greatly compromises the manner in which subsequent
clearances take place as such projects are considered as a fait accompli
by both the developer and the state government. Moreover, it leaves
no room for an assessment of options for development planning in
areas where these projects are coming up. The Comptroller and Auditor
General (CAG) of India, the supreme audit institution in the country,
has, in a performance audit6  for 2008 – 9 for the state of Sikkim,
highlighted serious concerns about the manner in which projects have
been handed out to some private hydropower players. While the
Meghalaya Legislative Assembly has seen a debate and enquiry on the
manner in which projects had been allotted to hydropower projects in
the state, the Assam Legislative Assembly has debated the implications
of the dams’ juggernaut in upstream Arunachal Pradesh. In Arunachal
Pradesh too, local affected communities, civil society groups, the media
and opposition political parties have repeatedly raised serious concerns
about the process of rapidly allotting projects to power developers
without any public consultation.
Despite the concern raised by a central minister about the ‘MoU
virus’, the Central Government has proactively granted various
clearances to these projects ignoring important concerns. At least two
dozen large hydroelectric projects have got final environmental
clearance in the Northeast. Other than seven large hydroelectric projects
in Arunachal Pradesh which have already received final environmental
FACTS ON NORTHEAST HYDRO
  Assessed hydroelectric power potential of the  Northeast:
63, 257 MW1
This is 43% of the total assessed hydropower potential of the country
Assam: 680 MW, Arunachal Pradesh: 50,328 MW, Manipur:
1784 MW, Meghalaya: 2394 MW, Mizoram: 2196 MW, Nagaland:
1574 MW, Sikkim: 4286 MW, Tripura: 15 MW
State-level figures may vary depending on updation by State
Governments. E.g. Arunachal Pradesh now estimates a potential of
57,000 MW. Revised figures for the full Northeast region would be
closer to 170 hydropower projects for a total capacity of 70,000 MW
  Large hydropower projects (above 25 MW) already in
operation in Northeast
Sikkim: Rangit III, Teesta V
Assam: Kopili, Khangdong, Lower Borpani (Karbi Langpi)
Manipur: Loktak
Meghalaya: Umiam Umtru IV, Kyrdamkulai, Umiam Stage I
Arunachal Pradesh: Ranganadi Stage I
Nagaland: Doyang
11 projects with total installed capacity of 1686 MW
  Large hydropower under construction in Northeast
Sikkim: Chujachen, Teesta III, Teesta VI, Rangit IV, Jorethang Loop
Arunachal Pradesh: Kameng, Lower Subansiri, Pare
Meghalaya: Myndtu, New Umtru
10 projects with total installed capacity of 4891 MW. Many projects across the
region are at various stages of clearance and be shortly under construction.
  Arunachal Pradesh – Biggest hydropower player in region2
 132 hydropower projects with total installed capacity of 40, 140.5 MW
already allotted by State Government to private and public sector players
as of October 2010
 92 of these are large hydropower projects (above 25 MW)
 38 of these are above 100 MW
 50 projects granted Scoping or pre-construction environmental
clearances (first stage) by Environment Ministry from September 2006
– October 2010
 7 hydro projects have received final environmental clearance till
October 2010
1 Central Electricity Authority data from report of Inter-Ministerial Group
on NE Hydro, February 2010. Slight variation with CEA 2001 data.
2 Arunachal Pradesh state government and Ministry of Environment &
Forests data.
Central Electricity Authority projections (2001) identify 168 hydropower projects for a
total capacity of 63,328 MW in the Northeast
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Damming Northeast India4
clearance, at least 50 have received first stage environmental clearance
for carrying out pre-construction activities. While pre-construction
clearances do not necessarily translate into final clearances, existing
experience shows that the Ministry of Environment and Forests
(MoEF) grants final environmental clearance to over 95% of all projects
which it appraises for their environmental and social impacts.
The government and the proponents of large dams in the region
paint a win-win picture: exploiting the country’s largest perennial
water system to produce plentiful power for the nation; economic
benefits for Northeastern state governments through export of power
to other parts of the country; employment generation; comparatively
little direct displacement of local communities as compared to elsewhere
in the country; the promise of the dams and private capital changing
the perceived ‘lack of development’ scenario of the region forever.
THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT (EIA) FARCE
Considering the unique features of the region and the scale of
intervention planned, it is critical that the social and environmental
impacts are carefully assessed before deciding whether these projects
are truly feasible. Large hydroelectric projects need to pass through
mandatory ‘environmental clearance’ procedures, administered by the
MoEF, to evaluate their viability on environmental and social grounds.
Based on their specific location, they could also require other clearances
such as ‘forest clearance’ from MoEF and approval from the Standing
Committee of the National Board for Wildlife (NBWL) for locations
inside or within 10 km radius of wildlife protected areas (PAs).  A key
feature of the environmental clearance process is the Environmental
Impact Assessment (EIA) report, which is a critical document aiding
the decision-making. It is important to note that this is the only study
under current clearance mechanisms to include a mandatory
component on social impact assessment.
RUN-OF-THE-RIVER (ROR) HYDRO1
The Bureau of Indian Standards Code IS: 4410 defines a Run-of-
the-River Power Station as:
A power station utilizing the run of the river flows for generation of
power with sufficient pondage for supplying water for meeting diurnal2
or weekly fluctuations of demand. In such stations, the normal course
of the river is not materially altered.
IS: 4410 defines a Storage Dam as:
This dam impounds water in periods of surplus supply for use in
periods of deficient supply. These periods may be seasonal, annual
or longer.
The term ‘run-of-the-river’ hydro is a cause of major confusion in
the public at large and definitions of the term around the world may
vary from the above definition. According to some, a project is RoR
only if inflow equals outflow on a real-time basis, i.e. if there is no
storage or flow modification at all. Others (like the BIS definition above),
use the term to refer to projects with relatively smaller storages and
lesser flow modification.  But contrary to the popular image created by
dam proponents that the river is flowing unhindered and unaltered, the
ground reality may be quite different.
Most of the so called ‘run-of-the-river’ hydroelectric projects being
developed in the Himalayan region involve large dams which divert
the river waters through long tunnels, before the water is dropped back
into the river at a downstream location after passing through a
powerhouse. These projects are promoted as being ‘environmentally
benign’ as they involve smaller submergences and lesser regulation of
water as compared to conventional storage dams. This perception
conveniently ignores the impact of several features intrinsic to this
design. For example, long stretches of the river will be bypassed between
the dam and powerhouse, with up to 85 - 90 % of the river flow in the
winter (lean season) diverted through the tunnels. In the 510 MW Teesta
V project in Sikkim the ‘head race tunnel’ taking the water from the dam
to the powerhouse is 18.5 km long and bypasses a 23 km length of the
river. Not only will this destroy riverine ecology, but a cascade of projects
will mean most of the river would essentially end up flowing through
tunnels. The Affected Citizens of Teesta have aptly described this as:
“Our sacred Teesta is being converted into an underground river.”
These projects also involve extensive tunneling in a geologically
fragile landscape, the environmental and social impacts of which are
grossly underestimated. Impacts observed include cracks in houses above
long tunnel alignments, drying up of water resources and major
landslides. The list of project-affected-persons is clearly much longer
than what is calculated at the planning stage which only looks at those
whose lands are to be directly acquired for various project components.
The tunneling also generates a huge quantity of muck and rock debris,
the disposal of which is huge challenge. Power companies in Sikkim
have earned themselves the name uttani musa (mountain mouse in the
Nepali language) for digging the insides of the Sikkim mountains. The
indiscriminate dumping of such massive quantities of excavated muck
in steep Himalayan valleys with little available flat land has been
another cause of serious impacts and environmental violations in
projects. This is a fact corroborated by the Comptroller and Auditor
General (CAG) of India in a 2009 report on Sikkim.3
Another type of RoR project being built is that which has a ‘dam-toe’
powerhouse located immediately downstream of the dam. Examples of
such projects are the 2,700 MW Lower Siang, the 1,750 MW Demwe
Lower (Lohit) and the 2,000 MW Lower Subansiri located in the Arunachal
foothills just before these rivers enter the plains. However, the impact of
these mega RoR projects is certainly not small. The reservoir of the 2,000
MW Lower Subansiri project will submerge a 47 km length of the Subansiri
river while the 2,700 MW Lower Siang project will submerge a 77.5 km
length of the Siang river (total 100 km length of various rivers to be
submerged in this project).  The above-mentioned projects will also
cause drastic daily fluctuation in river flows downstream (see section ‘We
all live downstream’) due to power generation patterns, particularly in
winter. Dam proponents argue that these projects are benign since the
total flow in the river downstream over any 10 – day period in the year will
be the same as in the pre-dam condition. But they fail to acknowledge
that the massively altered daily flow patterns will have serious social and
environmental impacts in the Brahmaputra floodplains.
There are other issues related to siting of such projects and their
impacts in the ecologically and geologically fragile, seismically active
The EIA report of the 1750 MW Demwe Lower project was completely silent on the
downstream impacts of the project on critically endangered grassland birds such as the
Bengal Florican in the Lohit river basin.
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What about the quality of these EIA reports for dams in Northeast
India? Let us, for example, look at certain biodiversity aspects of the
EIA reports.  Dr. Anwaruddin Choudhury, renowned naturalist from
Northeast India, has examined EIA reports of at least five large
hydroelectric projects – Kameng, Lower Subansiri, Middle Siang,
Tipaimukh, and Dibang – and finds them all poor on wildlife aspects.
A common feature of his introductory comments on these reports has
been: “contains innumerable (instances of ) incorrect data, unverified
and superfluous statements, and above all reveals the casual approach,”
referring to the power companies and EIA consultants. Dr. Choudhury
says: “It is shocking that mega hydel projects in the northeast are being
granted clearances based on such reports. How can we decide the fate
of some of the country’s most important wildlife habitats based on
sub-standard impact assessment studies?”
Here are a few examples from these reports: the EIA for the 1,000
MW Siyom project lists 5 bird species in an area which has over 300 and
even in this short list has one which is non-existent; the EIA for the 600
MW Kameng project reclassifies carnivores such as the red panda, pangolins
and porcupines as herbivores; the EIA for the 2,000 MW Lower Subansiri
lists 55 species of fish in a river which has at least 156 and reports an area
called the ‘Arctic’ in the Eastern Himalayas.
But these days citizens’ groups are getting cynical and increasingly
reluctant to send their comments on poor EIA reports to the
government. That is because necessary additional and credible studies
are rarely asked for by authorities. On the contrary, the reports are
sanitised by developers based on the comments received, to weed out
problematic portions, and the projects conveniently granted clearance.
In some cases additional rapid EIAs have been asked for, which
prove to be entirely inadequate.  In the Lower Subansiri project on the
Assam-Arunachal Pradesh border, the Zoological Survey of India (ZSI)
spent six days doing an additional study and then made surprising
statements such as: “...The long and vast water body thus created by
the reservoir will be happy haunt for aquatic creatures.” It is well
known that native aquatic species, whose habitats are fast-flowing
rivers, do not find the still waters of a reservoir a ‘happy haunt’! While
reservoirs may benefit exotic species that are introduced for fisheries,
such introduction has very often proved to be detrimental to the
native species. It is a matter of serious concern that reputed government
institutions such as ZSI have given such poor reports. While biodiversity
was used as an indicator in the above examples, the reports have been
found to be poor in many social and environmental aspects in general.
In some cases the MoEF has indeed asked for additional detailed
studies when EIAs were found to be poor, but often they have been
post-clearance studies! There is little logic in first clearing the way for
destruction of wildlife habitats and then doing a detailed assessment
as a formality after project work and environmental destruction is well
under way.
Another trend has been to grant clearances to projects that destroy
sensitive wildlife habitat based on poor assessments, and then claim to
compensate the losses by asking for other areas to be protected. While
appropriate compensatory mechanisms may be relevant in some cases,
they cannot substitute a sound decision-making process based on
comprehensive environmental and social impact assessment.  The main
problem in current environmental decision-making processes is that
virtually every project is treated as a fait accompli both by the Expert
Committees appraising these projects and the regulatory authorities
concerned. This subverts the possibility of a proper environmental
decision-making process.
and culturally sensitive Northeast. For example the Expert Committee
of IIT Guwahati, Dibrugarh University and Gauhati University which
studied the downstream impacts of the 2,000 MW Lower Subansiri
project has stated in its final recommendations of June 2009 that such
a mega dam is inappropriate in such a geologically and seismologically
sensitive location.
Hydropower proponents are currently running a misleading campaign
which claims that the RoR projects being built in states such as Arunachal
Pradesh do not even include construction of dams! It needs to be
clarified here that the bulk of the projects involve not just dams, but
large dams4 , as defined by India’s Central Water Commission, the
International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) and the World
Commission on Dams. Irrespective of the nature of project, dams
fragment rivers, breaking the organic linkages between the upstream
and downstream, between the river and its floodplain.
It is clearly misleading to universally label RoR projects as ‘socially
and environmentally benign’ projects. Whether of RoR or storage type,
both the individual and cumulative impacts of hydropower projects in
any river basin need to be comprehensively scrutinised and understood.
This, together with free, prior and informed public consent, should be
the basis of decision-making on these projects.
1 Some of the key documents referred to for this box include: Draft fact-
sheet on RoR projects, Kalpavriksh (upcoming); Hoover, R. Dams Lite?
Run-of-River Projects No Panacea. World Rivers Review. August 2001;
Restructured Rivers: Hydropower in the Era of Competitive Markets,
International Rivers Network, 2001.
2 Daily
3 http://www.cag.gov.in/html/cag_reports/sikkim/rep_2009/
civil_chap1.pdf
4 ICOLD defines large dams as: ‘those having a height of 15 meters
from the foundation or, if the height is between 5 to 15 meters, having a
reservoir capacity of more than 3 million cubic meters’.
Plans for multiple large run-of-the-river hydropower projects in Sikkim will leave
virtually no stretch of the Teesta river flowing free
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Damming Northeast India6
DAMS AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS
A recurring theme through this briefing paper is the environmental
risks aggravated due to the presence of large dams, as well as those
faced by the dams themselves, in the Northeastern region (see section
on ‘Hydropower and climate change’ and box on ‘Dams and Floods’
for example). Despite this, environmental risk assessment is perhaps
one of the weakest links in the Environment Impact Assessment
framework. Currently, the only mandatory risk assessment requirement
is to conduct a ‘dam-break analysis’ which predicts the effects of
flooding downstream, in case the dam actually breaks.
The Expert Committee studying the downstream impacts of the
Lower Subansiri hydroelectric projects has highlighted risks of
constructing large dams in a geologically and seismologically sensitive
area. The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India has, in a
2009 report reviewing the implementation of the 10th Five Year Plan
projects by NHPC and NEEPCO1  in the Northeastern and Eastern
region, expressed concern about the time and money being spent on
geological survey and investigations being lower than global standards.
This is closely linked with a relatively poor understanding of ‘geological
surprises’, a major environmental risk during construction of
hydroelectric projects, particularly in the Himalayan region.  It must be
noted that the CAG observation is related to a public sector company
like NHPC which has the maximum experience vis-à-vis building
hydroelectric projects in the country. The situation is likely be grimmer
with the private players, with little or no prior experience of building
large hydropower projects.
Let us take the example of earthquakes. Currently the focus is only
on whether the dam will withstand the earthquake. Occasionally, the
issue of whether the water reservoir itself can induce seismic activity is
discussed. While these are both very important aspects, they are not the
only earthquake associated risks as far as dams are concerned. Researchers
in the Northeast have been highlighting overall impacts of earthquakes
on river systems2, which can increase risks to and from existing large
dams. Dam engineers are quick to point out that a particular dam may
survive a major earthquake, but even assuming that the actual structure
is able to withstand a powerful tremor, quake-induced changes in the
river system may have a serious impact on the viability of the project
itself, as several basic parameters vis-à-vis the regime of rivers, and the
morphology and behaviour of channels, may change. The last two
major earthquakes in the region (1897 and 1950) caused landslides on
the hill slopes and led to the blockage of river courses, flash floods due
to sudden bursting of these temporary dams, raising of riverbeds due to
heavy siltation, fissuring and sand venting, subsidence or elevation of
existing river and lake bottoms and margins, and the creation of new
water bodies and waterfalls due to faulting.
Analysis of the available scientific data clearly indicates that the neo-
tectonism of the Brahmaputra valley and its surrounding highlands in the
eastern Himalayas has pronounced effects on the flooding, sediment
transport and depositional characteristics of the river and its tributaries,
which in turn has a bearing on the long-term viability of dams. The
earthquake of 1950, for example, raised the bed level of the Brahmaputra
at Dibrugarh by at least three metres (10 feet) leading to increased flood
and erosion hazard potential in the river. Brahmaputra expert, Dr. Dulal
Goswami, says: “A single earthquake event could cause sedimentation
equivalent to several decades of normal sedimentation during the high
flow period.” This could certainly render many of the proposed dams
economically unviable as dam life is intricately connected with rates of
sedimentation. However, this is yet to be studied as part of risk assessment.
Another important environmental risk was discussed for the first time
by the EAC on River Valley and Hydroelectric projects in July 2009 with
respect to the 3,000 MW Dibang Multipurpose project. In its meeting the
committee noted: “After critically examining all the issues the committee
noted that the Dibang high dam is located in high seismic zone V and the
area receives very high rainfall during monsoon. The dam impounds huge
reservoir stretch (43.0 km). A situation may arise when high rainfall together
with a major earthquake may occur. The steep slopes charged with rain
water and triggered with earthquake are very vulnerable and may lead to
large scale landslide. A major landslide may occur into the reservoir which
may lead to creation of water waves in the reservoir....overtopping causing
serious safety problems may happen.”
This is a very crucial risk to the downstream areas even if the dam
stands intact. In October 1963, the Vaiont dam in Italy, one of the world’s
tallest, set off earthquakes as soon as its reservoir began to fill. One tremor
set off landslides that plunged into the reservoir, creating a huge wave that
overtopped the dam by 110 metres. About two minutes later, the town of
Longarone was leveled and almost all of its 2,000 inhabitants killed.3
However, except for the one discussion in July 2009, the EAC has been
silent on the need for such risk assessment studies while evaluating umpteen
projects in the Northeastern region for environment-related clearances.
1 The full-form of NHPC used to earlier be National Hydroelectric Power
Corporation. Now the name has been changed to ‘NHPC Ltd.’ without a
full-form. NEEPCO is the North Eastern Electric Power Corporation.
2 Goswami, D.C. and Das, P.J., 2002. Hydrological Impact of earthquakes
on the Brahmaputra river regime, Assam: A study in exploring some
evidences. Proceedings of the 18th National Convention of Civil
Engineers, November 9-10, 2002, Institution of Engineers (India), Assam
State Centre, Guwahati, pp. 40-48.
3 McCully, Patrick, 2007. Before the Deluge: Coping with Floods in a
Changing Climate. A report by International Rivers.
Dr. Dulal Goswami, environment scientist and renowned expert
on the Brahmaputra river basin says: “The geophysical nature of the
Brahmaputra river basin is fragile and dynamic.  The scientific
knowledge base on the river system is currently very poor, for example
on aspects such as sedimentation and hydrology which are linked to
the economic life of the project. This needs to be strengthened urgently,
more so in light of emerging threats from climate change (see separate
section). Without the availability of comprehensive information, how
can we determine the long-term viability of projects in this region?
The wisdom of such public policy has to be questioned. Economic
viability apart, the mega-projects planned come with tremendous
ecological and social costs which are unacceptable.”
UNDERESTIMATING SOCIAL IMPACTS
One of the major arguments put forward in New Delhi to ‘sell’ large
hydroelectric projects in the Northeast, is that there is relatively ‘small
displacement’ by submergence as compared to that in other parts of the
country and therefore these projects are benign. But a careful perusal of
the ground situation indicates that displacement, particularly of livelihoods
and rights is grossly underestimated. Azing Pertin of the Siang Peoples
Forum in Arunachal Pradesh says “Since our state is hilly, there is very little
land where permanent cultivation is possible. Virtually all our available
arable lands will be submerged by the 2700 MW Lower Siang project in
the affected area in the Siang Valley. The magnitude of impact has to be
understood keeping this context in mind. It is misleading to argue that
the land being lost is a small percentage of the total area of the district or
state and wrongly assume that the project is benign.”
The impacts of dams on resources under common use (e.g. pasture
lands), vital to livelihoods of local communities, is also a major missing
link in impact assessment of projects.7  Shifting agriculture (jhum) is a
dominant traditional land use in the hills of Northeast India and plays
a critical role in the livelihoods of people, maintaining agricultural
biodiversity and providing food security. Increasing pressures on land
have resulted in the shortening of jhum cycles (the length of the fallow
period between two cropping phases), thus impacting the ecological
viability of this farming system. The submergence of land by hydel
projects will further shorten the jhum cycle and enhance the pressure
on the surrounding areas, thus affecting the environment and the
livelihoods of jhum-dependent communities over a much larger
landscape. In addition to the submergence, land use restrictions will
apply in the catchment area of the reservoir as per mandatory norms to
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reduce siltation and to increase the
life of the reservoir.  Further,
compensatory mechanisms required
as per forest laws to offset the loss of
forests due to the project, also lead
to protection of other areas,
affecting community access to land
and resources.  Take, for example,
the conversion of Unclassified State
Forests in Arunachal Pradesh,
which allow more access and control
by local communities, into
Protected Forests, with greater state
control.8  The impacts on rights
of local communities in such cases
also need to be examined in terms
of the Scheduled Tribes and Other
Traditional Forest Dwellers
(Recognition of Forest Rights)
Act, 2006.
Clearly the impact on local
communities is well beyond just the
submergence area. However, in the existing planning and decision-
making process, the social and environmental impacts over the larger
landscape due to various aspects described above are not assessed. This
is therefore not reflected in the decision-making on the overall viability
of the project.
States such as Arunachal Pradesh are home to small populations of
culturally sensitive indigenous communities. Therefore, direct and
indirect displacement is high if looked at in the perspective of local
population (as opposed to the population of the country). Dr. Mite
Lingi, Chairman of the Idu Indigenous Peoples Forum, says “The
‘small displacement’ argument to sell these projects as being benign
needs to be confronted. The entire population of the Idu Mishmi
tribe is around 9500 and at least 17 large hydel projects have been
planned in our home, the Dibang Valley in Arunachal. As per this
faulty argument, little social impact will be indicated even if our entire
population were supposedly displaced!”  The land in the state has also
been customarily delineated between different indigenous
communities and clans. Therefore, contrary to popular belief, there
isn’t plenty of land for resettling people in the state, just because the
population density is less.
Further, the concerns being expressed in states like Arunachal Pradesh
and Sikkim are not restricted to the issue of displacement.  The over-900-
day satyagraha in Sikkim by affected indigenous communities from 2007-
9 focused on the impacts of hydel projects on Dzongu, the holy land and
reserve of the Lepcha tribe. The protests have also received the support of
the Buddhist monk community in Sikkim, as a sacred landscape stands to
be desecrated. Sociologist Vibha Arora says: “Such protests are not merely
on grounds of displacement but that the region’s cultural and ethnic
traditions are rooted in the river Teesta and its environs.”  A major concern
in the Northeast is the influx of large labour populations from outside the
region. Dr. Lingi adds, “We have been given constitutional and legal
protection, particularly with respect to our land rights and restricted entry
of outsiders. These projects are going to require both skilled and unskilled
labour which Arunachal Pradesh cannot provide. 17 large projects in the
Dibang Valley will bring in outside labour, upwards of 150,000 people,
for long periods, as these are long gestation projects. We are concerned
about the demographic changes and other socio-cultural impacts associated
with this, as the Idu Mishmis are only 9500 in number. The development
policies are in glaring contradiction to the constitutional and legal protection
we have been given.”
Police stop a peace march by Buddhist monks and other groups against large hydel
projects in Sikkim in 2007. The march was held on Gandhi Jayanti, October 2nd.
Women activists at a protest rally against large dams held in Itanagar, the capital of Arunachal Pradesh, in July 2007.
The Idu Mishmi community, opposed to the 3,000 MW Dibang Multipurpose project, block
the conduct of what they believe was a farcical public hearing in March 2008.
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Despite major movements emerging in the region raising serious
concerns about the impacts of dams, it will be misleading to argue that
there is universal opposition to hydropower projects across the
Northeast. In states such as Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur,
there are also those amongst local communities who are defending the
projects. Monetary gains from sale of land,  small contracts during
construction and a promise of quicker development of basic
infrastructure like roads and bridges is cited as a major motivation.
Responding to these arguments, journalist-activist Raju Mimi, from
Dibang Valley, Arunachal Pradesh says: “We certainly want a bridge
across the Lohit river at Dholla ghat. But the government cannot
thrust on us some of the world’s largest hydropower projects, such as
3,000 MW Dibang and 4,000 MW Etalin, by promising that we
will get a bridge in return! What kind of governance is this? We should
get the bridge irrespective of whether these hydropower projects come
up or not.”
While dam related opposition has primarily been seen in states
such as Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim and Manipur in recent
times, the state of Mizoram saw a major rally against dams in the
Sinlung hills in September 2010. Perhaps the first of its kind in the
state, the rally was organised by the Sinlung Indigenous Peoples Human
Rights Organisation (SIPHRO) and Sinlung Peoples Collective in
Aizawl, the capital of Mizoram. Their memorandum to the Chief
Minister, also signed by a wide array of civil society groups in the state
who participated in the rally, argues that dams are being pushed for
the benefit of a minority of influential individuals in the state who
seek to corner the financial gains from compensation and contracts.
They cite the examples of the Serlui B and Tuirial hydropower projects
wherein they claim that has already happened. Opposing the plans to
extensively dam all big and small rivers in the Singlung hills, they state
that the land, rivers and forests are the backbone of the existence and
survival of the Hmar and other indigenous people of the region. A
crucial argument they make is that their very citizenship and democratic
rights are integrally embedded with the land, forests and rivers and
these must be safeguarded and protected for all time to come.
WE ALL LIVE DOWNSTREAM
An issue of  heated current debate in the Northeast is the
downstream impacts of dams, often a lacuna in the broader popular
discourse on the impacts of dams in the country, which is primarily
influenced by upstream submergence and displacement. When large
dams block the flow of a river, they also trap sediments and nutrients
vital for fertilising downstream plains. They alter the natural flow
regimes which drive the ecological processes in the downstream areas.
Quite literally they disrupt the connections between the upstream
and the downstream, between a river and its floodplain.
A major catalyst to trigger the larger debate on downstream impacts
of dams in Assam, has been the repeated incidents of  dam-induced
floods across the state from upstream projects (e.g. 405 MW Ranganadi
in Arunachal Pradesh) in recent years. Downstream impact concerns
raised in the Northeast include: loss of fisheries; changes in beel
(wetland) ecology in the flood plains; impacts on agriculture on the
chapories (riverine islands and tracts); impacts on various other
livelihoods due to blockage of rivers by dams (e.g. driftwood collection,
sand and gravel mining); increased flood vulnerability due to massive
boulder extraction from river beds for dam construction and sudden
water releases from reservoirs in the monsoons; dam safety and associated
risks in this geologically fragile and seismically active region. The
Brahmaputra valley, a thickly populated narrow strip of land with
hills surrounding it, has awoken to the fact that it is going to be
increasingly vulnerable to risks from existing and proposed large dams
upstream. This realization has been significant for a civilisation whose
cultural identity – customs, food habits, music, religious beliefs – is
inextricably linked to its river systems.9
One of the key issues which have come up is the drastic daily variation
in river flows which will take place after these dams are commissioned,
particularly in winter. For example, the average winter (lean season)
flow in the Subansiri river in its natural state is approximately 400 cubic
metres per second10  (cumecs). Both the ecology of the downstream
areas and people’s use of the riverine tracts in winter is adapted to this
‘lean’ but relatively uniform flow of water on any particular day (even
though there is a gradual variation through the season). Chapories, for
example, which are exposed and drier in winter are used for both
agriculture and cattle grazing purposes, by local communities, and
simultaneously by wildlife. After the commissioning of the 2,000 MW
Lower Subansiri project, flows in the Subansiri river in winter will
fluctuate drastically on a daily basis from 6 cumecs for around 20 hours
(when water is being stored behind the dam) to 2560 cumecs for
around 4 hours when the water is released for power generation at the
time of peak power demand in the evening hours. Thus the river will be
starved for 20 hours and then flooded for 4 hours with flows fluctuating
between 2 percent and 600 percent of normal flows on a daily basis.
The flow during peak load water releases in the Subansiri river in
winter will be equivalent to average monsoon flows and will cause a
The 2,700 MW Lower Siang project in Arunachal Pradesh will submerge most of the arable
lands in the affected area.
The ecology of wetlands (beels) in the Brahmaputra valley is intricately connected with
the rivers. Dam-induced changes will also impact the downstream wetlands and those
whose livelihoods are dependent on these.
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‘winter flood’ drowning on a daily basis drier riverine tracts used
both by people and wildlife throughout winter.  The downstream
livelihoods and activities likely to be impacted by this unnatural
flow fluctuation in the Eastern Himalayan rivers include: fishing,
flood-recession agriculture (e.g. mustard), river transportation and
livestock rearing in grasslands for dairy-based livelihoods.  But
downstream communities are yet to be officially acknowledged as
project-affected persons due to upstream dams. Flow fluctuations
in rivers such as Lohit, Dibang, Siang and Subansiri will seriously
impact breeding grounds of critically endangered grassland birds
such as the Bengal Florican, foraging areas of the endangered wild
water buffalo, habitat of the endangered ganges river dolphin and
important National Parks such as Dibru-Saikhowa and Kaziranga.
The natural flow pattern of a river is like its ‘heart beat’ and alternate
starving and flooding of these major rivers on a daily basis is a threat
to the ecological and social security of the Brahmaputra floodplains.
Assam has seen serious concern raised by a wide sector of civil
society groups (e.g. mass movements and major students unions) on
the downstream concerns vis-à-vis the spate of mega dams planned
in Arunachal Pradesh. A major focus of conflict has been the
2,000 MW Lower Subansiri project, under construction on the
Assam-Arunachal Pradesh border. Downstream agitations by local
movements and the All Assam Students Union (AASU) led to the
setting up of an interdisciplinary expert committee11  to study the
downstream impacts of the project. Interim recommendations were
made by this committee in February 2009 to stop work pending
completion of the report. But they were ignored by the power
company and both the State and Central governments. In their final
report submitted in June 2010 this committee has recommended
that: “…The selected site for the mega dam of the present dimension was
not appropriate in such a geologically and seismologically sensitive
location…Therefore, it is recommended not to construct the mega dam
in the present site…”
Following a major debate in the Assam Legislative Assembly in
July 2009, a House Committee was set-up to
look at the impacts of dams on downstream Assam.
The committee, in its July 2010 report, has
categorically endorsed the Expert Committee
recommendations raising concerns about the
Lower Subansiri project. On August 12th, the
Rajya Sabha (Upper House of Parliament) saw a
lively discussion on the issue in response to a calling
attention motion by a Member of Parliament
from Assam, Birendra Prasad Baishya. On
September 10th, the Union Environment
Minister, Jairam Ramesh, held a public
consultation on the issue in Guwahati as a
follow-up to a meeting, with a delegation led
by the Krishak Mukti Sangram Samiti, a major
peasants’ movement in Assam in August 2010.
Along with the Brahmaputra valley in Assam,
downstream impact debates have also raged in
Manipur and in southern Assam, in the Barak
Valley, downstream of the proposed 1500 MW
Tipaimukh dam. A long battle fought by those
affected by the Mapithel dam in Manipur in
the Thoubal river basin has forced the state
government to conduct a review of the impacts of the project,
including in the downstream areas.
While media reports seem to indicate that the Union
Environment Minister has communicated to the Prime Minister
the concerns raised in the September 10th public consultation in
Guwahati, we need to wait and watch whether the Centre responds
adequately to the serious concerns raised in the downstream areas
of proposed projects. However, the experience of decision-making
until now makes one thing amply clear: the Central Government
has been in denial of a basic fact of nature - that a river flows
downstream. This is evident from the Terms of Reference (ToR)
for Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) studies granted by the
MoEF for at least 50 large hydroelectric projects in Arunachal
Pradesh from September 2006 to August 2010. In most cases  the
‘baseline data’ is restricted to only 10 km. downstream of the project
and the actual ‘impact prediction’ has been asked to be restricted
to an even shorter distance downstream-only between the dam
and powerhouse! There is only one aspect which is mandatory to
be studied beyond 10 km downstream in all cases; this is the ‘dam-
break analysis’ which predicts the effects of flooding downstream,
in case the dam actually breaks. But dam-break is not the only
downstream risk a dam poses, as indicated earlier. Unfortunately,
most detailed downstream studies are only prescribed as post-
clearance studies as has been done in the environmental clearance
granted to the 1,500 MW Tipaimukh Multipurpose project in
October 2008 and to the 1,750 MW Demwe Lower project on
the Lohit river in February 2010.  This clearly indicates that the
projects are being treated as a fait accompli and the clearance
processes as a formality. It was only recently that the MoEF for the
first time prescribed partial downstream impact studies for a few
projects before grant of clearance (e.g. 3,000 MW Dibang
Multipurpose project and 2,700 Lower Siang). But the ToRs in
these cases, too, do not ask for comprehensive downstream studies,
which should have been the case.
Local movements make their presence felt at a rally downstream of the under-construction 2,000 MW Lower Subansiri
hydroelectric project organised by the Mising Students Union and the Krishak Mukti Sangram Samiti.
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The Hydropower-Climate Change Nexus:
Myth, Science and Risk for Northeast India
By Partha J. Das
INTRODUCTION
The scientific evidence that the Himalayan region is being
impacted by climate change is growing, with serious ramifications for
Himalayan river basins and the Indian subcontinent.  Studies show
that hydrological characteristics such as discharge pattern, sediment
load, snowmelt run off and intensity and frequency of flooding in
Himalayan Rivers are changing due to climate change. The
Brahmaputra river basin is particularly sensitive to climate change
impacts, implying changes in volume of water, sediment and
biogeochemical processes.
One reason cited by promoters of hydropower development in
developing countries is that energy from hydropower is “clean” because,
unlike thermal energy, its production does not generate green house gases
(GHG). Therefore it is suggested that by investing in hydro, developing
countries like China and India that emit large amounts of GHGs can
reduce or slow the growth of their carbon emissions and contribute to
mitigating climate change. However, recent research has generated enough
information to question this assumption.
Since dams are designed around known characteristics of rivers
and local geology, it is natural that changes in the hydrological regime
triggered by climate change will affect the existence, operation and
management of these projects considerably. However this aspect is
usually ignored by agencies executing projects, making it difficult for
disaster management agencies as well as communities to anticipate
and prepare for possible hazards like flash floods.  Experts acknowledge
that the present knowledge base about hydrology, climate, ecology
and geology of the Himalayan region is inadequate to support large-
scale interventions on the Himalayan rivers. Climate change introduces
an additional layer of uncertainty to this evolving knowledge base.
As a result, the present development paradigm that envisages a
massive expansion in large dams in the northeast, is full of risk1. In the
sections ahead we discuss how the myth of green hydropower is being
DAMS AND FLOODS
By Himanshu Thakkar
A perception carefully built and nurtured by the proponents of big dams is
that dams control or help moderate floods. In theory, it sounds possible.
However, in practice, that perception won’t stand up to scrutiny if actual
experience with dams is objectively assessed.
People of Assam have been raising concerns about dam-induced floods
in downstream areas due to hydropower projects like Ranganadi, Umtru,
Karbi-Langpi, Kopili, and Kurichu. While the technocracy keeps disputing the
on-ground experience of people, it might help here to recount some of the
instances of dam-induced floods across the country.
In August 2006, Surat city on Tapi River in South Gujarat experienced the
worst floods in its history due to a sudden release of 7 to 10 lakh cusecs (cubic
feet per second) of water from the upstream Ukai dam. At least 150 people
were killed, 80% of the city was under water, and over 20 lakh people were
trapped inside the flooded city without drinking water, milk, electricity or
communication for four days and nights. This disaster could have been avoided
if the Ukai dam had adhered to the dam operating rules properly, keeping
in mind upstream and downstream rains and short-term forecasts, as well as
the capacity of the downstream river channel and the timing of the high tides.
The Ukai Dam story was repeated in many river basins across India in 2006,
including the Mahi, Sabarmati, Chambal, Narmada, Krishna, Godavari and
Mahanadi basins. A sudden high release of water from dams (many of them
having high pre-monsoon storages) was the prime reason for flood damages in
these basins. Each dam has specific operation rules. For example, lowering pre-
monsoon water storages to reduce downstream flood risk in monsoons, is often
a mandatory requirement. Many instances of dam-induced floods are due to
mismanagement of dams by faulty operations, while lack of proper operation
rules is also a reason in other cases. An overall lack of transparency and
accountability in dam operation in the country is an important contributing
factor to such disasters.
The floods of 2006 were in no way unique. Similar instances include:
Mahanadi floods in Orissa in September 2008 due to faulty operation of the
Hirakud dam, floods in the Damodar basin in 2009, floods in Punjab in 1988
(and also in 2010) due to sudden releases from the Bhakra and Pong dams,
floods in the Krishna basin in late September-early October in 2009 due to faulty
operation of the Upper Krishna, Tungabhadra, Srisailam and Nagarjunsagar
dams, floods in the Bhagirathi and Ganga river basin due to faulty operation of
the Tehri Dam in Sept 2010. Over the years, India has experienced escalating
flood damages despite the fact that the total area supposedly protected by
flood-control engineering projects has grown.
It is often claimed by the government that India’s 5,000 plus large dams
bring flood control benefits, yet all too often the results have been increased flood
damages, usually because of mismanagement. The National Commission on
Floods, set up by the Central Government, noted in 1980: “Most of the reservoirs
completed in the country do not have any specific operation schedules for
moderation of floods.” In the Ganga basin, the Kangsabati dam is supposed to
reserve more than a quarter of its reservoir for flood storage, yet the report says, “The
Kangsabati reservoir has no operation rules drawn up so far, nor have the moderation
benefits been evaluated.” A working group report of the Planning Commission
for the 11th Five year Plan and the Maharashtra government report after the 2006
floods corroborate such observations. Some changes brought about in the
functioning of the Ukai dam after the 2006 disaster also indirectly admits that the
dam was mismanaged in 2006. However, no accountability has been fixed on
dam operators in any of these instances.
The Way Forward: A comprehensive flood-management program should
revolve around improving and disseminating flood-forecasting, flood-coping
mechanisms and flood-preparedness. Some key areas that must be addressed
include sustaining and improving the natural systems’ ability to absorb
floodwaters; improving dam management (in existing projects), and instituting
clearly defined and transparent operating rules that are stringently enforced;
improving the maintenance of existing flood-control infrastructure rather than
spending money on new dams and embankments; undertaking a credible
performance appraisal of existing infrastructure in a participatory way, removing
dams and embankments that are found to be ineffective; and producing
transparent disaster management plans to be implemented in a participatory
way. Most importantly, India needs to assess the potential impacts of climate
change on rainfall and on the performance of flood-control infrastructure, to
begin planning for the crucial adaptation to changing climate.
In the Northeast, even as per official plans, most projects do not have an explicit
flood moderation component, thus there being no question of these being able to
effectively moderate floods. Out of the 130 plus hydropower agreements signed in
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CUMULATIVE IMPACTS OF DAMS, CARRYING CAPACITY
OF RIVER BASINS
With multiple dams in each river basin, the issue of cumulative
impacts of dams has become a crucial issue. The late Nari Rustomji,
who served as Assam’s Chief Secretary and Dewan of Sikkim had,
through his writings, warned that development inputs into Sikkim
needed to be within the absorptive capacity of the region. In 1998,
the Expert Appraisal Committee (EAC) on River Valley and
Hydroelectric projects, appointed by the MoEF, noted Rustomji’s
observations while examining a proposal for environmental clearance
for the 510 MW Teesta V hydroelectric project in Sikkim. Since this
was one of the multiple large hydroelectric works in the ecologically
and culturally sensitive Teesta river basin, the committee recommended
a detailed study on the ‘carrying capacity’ of the river basin before
taking a decision. But the MoEF granted clearance to the project
without such a study being completed in advance. However, one of
the conditions for clearance to the project was that “no other project in
Sikkim will be considered for environmental clearance till the carrying
capacity study is completed.”
In spite of this self-imposed condition the MoEF subsequently
granted environmental clearance to at least seven new hydroelectric
projects before the carrying capacity study was finally completed in
early 2008. The ministry has thus violated its own mandatory
condition. Sikkimese civil society groups such as the Affected Citizens
of Teesta (ACT) are disappointed that a golden opportunity has been
lost. There was hope that the carrying capacity study process would
enable a comprehensive assessment of cumulative impacts of the many
proposed hydroelectric projects and a serious options-assessment for
ecologically and culturally sensitive development in the Teesta river
disproved and a body of evidence is being built up to counter the
prevailing view. We also try to explain the implications of climate
change for hydropower projects and consequences for people with
respect to the Northeastern region, the Brahmaputra river basin in
particular.
HYDROPOWER GENERATION AGGRAVATES GLOBAL
WARMING AND CLIMATE CHANGE
Scientific evidence of greenhouse gas emissions (like methane,
carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide) from the reservoirs of hydroelectric
projects has been emerging since the 1990s2. However, the climate-
benign nature of hydropower was strongly questioned for the first
time by the World Commission on Dams (WCD) 3. It was known by
the year 2000 that globally 70 million tonnes of methane and a
billion tonnes of carbon dioxide were emitted annually from reservoir
surfaces. A recent study carried out by Brazil’s National Institute for
Space Research estimates that the large dams of the world emit 104
million tonnes of methane annually from reservoir surfaces, turbines,
spillways and downstream river courses4. Greenhouse gases like
methane and carbon dioxide are produced in reservoirs due to rotting
organic matter (vegetation) and carbon inflows from the catchment5.
Large dams of the world contribute about four percent of the total
warming impact of human activities and they could actually be the
single largest source of anthropogenic methane emissions, accounting
for about a quarter of the total methane emissions from the earth’s
surface6. Tropical shallow reservoirs where the natural carbon cycle is
most productive are the highest emitters of methane, while deep water
reservoirs exhibit lower emissions. Dams in Brazil and India are
responsible for a fifth of these countries’ total global warming impact,
although these sources of emissions are not considered in the national
greenhouse inventories.
According to the Inter Governmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) these revelations have challenged the conventional wisdom
that hydropower produces only positive atmospheric effects (e.g.,
reductions in emissions of carbon dioxide and nitrous oxides), when
compared with conventional power generation sources7.  Taking
cognizance of the GHG emissions from hydropower projects, the
executive board of the United Nations Framework Convention for
Climate Change (UNFCCC) has excluded large hydro projects with
significant water storage from its Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM)8 programme.  That means hydroelectric projects with big
storage dams are not considered as climate-friendly and therefore are
not accepted as desired alternatives for climate change mitigation or
adaptation.  The IPCC has recommended estimation of methane
emissions from large dams and evaluation of the net effect on the
carbon budget in the regions affected by large dams. A recent study
by Swiss scientists, released in October 2010, reveals that substantial
amounts of the greenhouse gas methane are released not only from
large tropical reservoirs but also from run-of-the-river (RoR) reservoirs,
especially in the summer, when water temperatures are higher. This
finding disputes the existing belief that RoR projects with smaller
reservoirs, particularly in temperate regions, are a climate-neutral way
of generating electricity9.
Arunachal Pradesh, only one project on the Dibang river is officially a
‘multipurpose’ project. Major hydropower projects in the lower reaches of several
rivers such as the Siang, Lohit and Subansiri are not multipurpose projects and
have negligible flood moderation components, even as per the admission of
project authorities. More importantly, many of the dam-induced floods occurrences
across the country, highlighted earlier, have been from dams with explicit flood
moderation components such Ukai, Damodar, Bhakra and Hirakud.
In conclusion, there is mounting evidence that structural measures
have been largely ineffective in controlling floods and have worsened
flooding in many parts of the country. Yet the State and Central
Governments’ in India – with support by international agencies like the
World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the Japanese Bank for
International Cooperation – are pushing for more, not fewer, of the same
structural solutions. The opportunity provided by the report of the World
Commission on Dams on reviewing, planning and decision-making
frameworks for large dams appears to have been completely lost on
India’s water managers. Affected local communities, however, are fighting
against such faulty measures at a number of places.
Himanshu Thakkar is the Coordinator of South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers & People.
For more information on Dams & Floods across the country visit www.sandrp.in
The June 14, 2008 floods in the Lakhimpur district of Assam were aggravated by
sudden releases from the 405 MW Ranganadi hydroelectric project.
DE
BO
JIT
 B
OR
UA
H/
GR
EE
N 
HE
RI
TA
GE
Damming Northeast India12
Contrary to the scientific evidence, project proponents have been
rhetorically promoting hydropower as clean and green to outweigh its
other known detrimental impacts. It is important to analyse the facts
emerging from recent scientific research to counter this misinformation.
ARE HYDRO-PROJECTS SUSTAINABLE UNDER
CLIMATE CHANGE?
Climate change is likely to cause such changes in local and regional
weather and climate patterns that would jeopardise dam operations
and trigger more complex and intensive impacts downstream. It has
been projected that Himalayan river basins like that of the
Brahmaputra river may experience increased summer flows and more
flooding for a few decades initially, due to rapid melting of Himalayan
and Trans-Himalayan snow and glaciers. In the long run however,
they will face scarcity of water as a result of progressive reduction of
flow as the river-feeding glaciers recede and disappear from the
headstreams10.  In fact, the Upper Brahmaputra river basin has already
lost roughly 20% of its water reserves bound in glaciers during the
thirty years between 1970 and 2000, which is equivalent to the loss
of 175 cubic km of glacier mass in that period and about 7 cubic km
of glacial mass loss per year11. While such melting of glaciers leads to
increased dry season run-off in the short term, in the long-term
there could be a decline of dry season river run-off from glaciers,
turning perennial rivers like the Brahmaputra into seasonal river
systems12. Although there will be an initial increase in flow in the
Brahmaputra basin due to accelerated glacial melt till about the
fourth decade of this century and increase in mean rainfall over the
upstream of Brahmaputra basin by about 25 per cent, the overall
summer and late spring discharges are eventually expected to be
reduced consistently and considerably, at least by 19.6% on an
average during the years 2046 to 206513.
The planning of  hydropower projects that are now operational
or in different stages of implementation in the Northeast, have not
incorporated any considerations for possible impacts of climate
change on the rivers and the dams, either when the projects were
being designed or when the EIA reports were being prepared. In the
case of many of these dams, the meteorological and hydrological
time series data of rainfall, extreme rainfall, water level and discharge
used to design dams, is not adequate to be able to provide a reliable
description of trends and periodicity of rainfall and river run-off.
These trends become more uncertain in a changing climate scenario,
resulting in large fluctuations in the normal inflows to the dams.
Such a situation usually disrupts normal operations of the dams
affecting power generation. IPCC predicts that extreme rainfall i.e.
episodes of very high and/or very low rainfall are likely to increase in
the Asian region in the coming decades14. In such a situation the
dams will either underperform due to lack of adequate flow or will
exacerbate flooding hazards triggered by excess flow. Therefore, to
adapt climatically, such dams would need to be redesigned with
inputs from high resolution regional climate models to generate
reliable future climate scenarios for specific geographical areas of
concern. This is not easy as of now, given the difficulty in developing
reliable climate simulations at small spatial scales.
basin. But the MoEF has continued granting clearance to one project
after another without seriously examining the issue in a holistic manner
as per its own mandated condition. After completion of the study in
2008, however, the MoEF had declared certain areas in North Sikkim
in the Teesta river basin as ‘no-go’ areas for dams. But this condition
too has been recommended for dilution by the EAC in early 2010,
threatening to open up the last free-flowing stretches of the Teesta in
Sikkim for more dams.
In fact, the National
Environmental Appellate Authority
(NEAA)12,  a special environmental
court, in an April 2007 order has also
observed that it feels the need for
“advance cumulative study of series
of different dams coming on any river
so as to assess the optimum capacity
of the water resource giving due
consideration to the requirement of
the Human beings, Cattle, Ecology/
Environment etc.”  However, this
order has been repeatedly violated by
the MoEF. Even though river basin-
level studies have been prescribed for
some river basins such as the Bichom
and Lohit in Arunachal Pradesh,
these have been de-linked from
clearances to be granted to individual
projects. Therefore, project clearance
can continue business as usual,
without completion of cumulative
studies, making it a cosmetic exercise.
In December 2008, the Standing Committee of the National
Board for Wildlife (NBWL) has relaxed a condition restricting
the construction of dams in the upstream areas of the Subansiri
river, imposed earlier while granting clearance in May 2003 to
the 2,000 MW Lower Subansiri hydroelectric project coming up
on the Arunachal Pradesh-Assam border. This relaxation has
happened without consultations in Assam, located downstream,
The cumulative social and environmental impacts of over 130 hydropower projects proposed in Arunachal Pradesh has been a matter
of intense debate in the state and in downstream Assam.
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13Damming Northeast India
Due to impact of climate change, water stress will be felt more in
winter, in general, which will be aggravated in weak monsoon years,
thus significantly affecting agriculture, the principal livelihood of the
people, and the overall economy of states like Assam, West Bengal,
Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, the main Brahmaputra basin states in
India.  Further, changing temperatures and evaporation rates would
alter soil moisture conditions and the amount of run-off from the
catchments into reservoirs15. Given this scenario, it will become
increasingly uncertain whether the required inflow of some rivers could
be sustained to produce power efficiently, especially in the lean season
in the future. This also brings into question the wisdom of investing
thousands of crores of public money in such ventures, when there is
so much uncertainty over the hydrological changes in the rivers in
the region under a changing climate. A recent study of hydro-electric
power generation conducted in the Zambezi Basin in Africa, taken
in conjunction with projections of future run-off, indicates
that hydropower generation would be negatively affected by
climate change16.
ARE DAMS’ SAFEGUARDS AGAINST CLIMATIC
UNCERTAINTY?
An argument made by promoters of large dams is that if
precipitation and river flows are likely to become uncertain and vary
widely due to climate change, then it is important to create large
storage dams in upstream areas to make water supplies more certain.
The faulty logic behind this argument is that more storage is necessary
to hold additional water volume if river flow increases and also to hold
the occasional peak flows, which can then be used to augment winter
flow from the reservoirs. That this is an unsound argument is seen
clearly when one considers the technical limitations and the very high
financial stakes involved with building large storage dams in the Greater
Himalayan region. Erratic increase in river flows will make it difficult
to operate the dams under specific designed conditions and put the
dams at high risk of flash floods due to Glacial Lake Outburst Flooding
(GLOFs)17 and cloud bursts18. On the other hand, big storage dams
also become economically unviable if constructed only to store
occasional high flows when average river run-off reduces because of
retreat of glaciers and uncertain precipitation19.
Adopting standards for evaluating the sustainability of hydropower
projects under different climate change scenarios is prescribed as an
important criterion for decision making in hydropower governance20,
which should be applied strictly to hydropower projects in the
Himalayan region.
HYDRO-PROJECTS MORE HAZARDOUS DUE TO
CLIMATE CHANGE
The frequency of heavy precipitation events has increased over
most land areas, consistent with warming and observed increases of
atmospheric water vapour. Intense rainfall events will become even
more frequent in the future.21 Dams are often seen to trigger flash
floods in downstream areas. The potential of such dam-induced flash
floods will increase due to climate change in the Northeastern region
because of the projected intense as well as erratic rainfall and run-off
in rivers. Since most of the hydropower plants in the region are run-
and ignoring a demand by some members of the committee to
first get an understanding of the cumulative impacts of 22 large
hydel projects which can potentially come up in the Subansiri
river basin, once the restriction has been lifted. The Inter-
Ministerial Group set-up to give recommendations for accelerating
hydropower development in the Northeast has, in its 2010 report,
specifically recommended that MoEF not hold up environmental
clearances pending completion of cumulative impact assessment
studies, thus rendering the entire exercise futile.
While the EAC in its September 2010 meeting has finally
expressed an opinion that a cumulative downstream impact
assessment does indeed  require to be carried out in Assam to
study the impacts of multiple projects in the Brahmaputra river
basin, it is silent on the need to halt environmental clearances of
individual projects until such a study is completed.
PEOPLE, DEVELOPMENT AND POWER
In the current situation it seems difficult to bring accountability
back to the governance process on these mega-hydel projects in the
Northeast, without addressing the arguments on development and
power being used to ride roughshod over some of the country’s most
important ecological landscapes, and the livelihood rights of the people
of the region.
The belief that each of these mega-power projects is crucial for
India’s energy security is a major reason for subversion of environmental
and social issues. This myth needs to be busted. Girish Sant of Prayas
Energy Group, a leading organisation working on public interest
power sector issues, says: “Development needs increased energy services.
But demand forecasts that planners make are usually an overestimate
and there is a bias towards centralised large projects to meet this highly
inflated demand. This is not the ‘least-cost’ way of getting the required
A protest rally against multiple dams planned in the Sinlung hills of Mizoram was held
in the state capital, Aizawl, on Sep 28, 2010.
Downstream groups in Assam team up with their counterparts in Arunachal Pradesh to
oppose a public hearing being held for the 3,000 MW Dibang Multipurpose project.
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Damming Northeast India14
of-the-river projects’, having little or no capacity to hold excess flows
(insignificant flood cushion), heavy rainfall in the upstream areas creates
a situation where it is a normal practice to release the excess water to
ensure the safety of the dam, thus resulting in flash floods downstream.
While dam authorities argue that they are only releasing water coming
from the upstream and not adding to the flood, the reality is that the
manner in which the dam is operated and the pattern of water release
can accentuate the impacts of flood in the downstream even if total
volumes of flood waters may not vary significantly from a no-dam
situation in a particular case.
Increase in intense rainfall events has accelerated the high rate of
soil erosion and landslides in the Himalayas. Sliding land, rock, mud
and snow masses often result in blocking river channels in steep
Himalayan valleys. When these naturally dammed rivers are eventually
breached under the growing pressure of water accumulating behind
the newly-formed dam, it leads to an avalanche of water gushing
down the hills and creating havoc as flash floods in downstream areas.
Landslide dam outburst floods (LDOF), as this type of flooding is
called, have been responsible for several large floods affecting northeast
India. The ‘Yigong flash floods’ triggered by the collapse of a landslide-
induced dam on the Yigongzangbu river - a large tributary of the
Yarlung Zangbo (Tsangpo) - on June 10, 2000, caused havoc in the
river Siang in the bordering areas of Arunachal and China with
estimated property losses of not less than a billion rupees, 30 deaths,
more than 100 people missing, and more than 50,000 rendered
homeless in five districts of Arunachal Pradesh.22 If  there happens to
services. With increasing conflicts over the siting of new power projects,
we urgently need an alternative approach towards power sector
planning – such as Integrated Resource Planning (IRP).13  Such an
approach can have substantial environmental and social benefits as
energy services can be delivered with a sizeable reduction in the number
of new power plants required by the country. IRP considers a mix of
supply side and demand side solutions while giving equal importance
to both. It includes a combination of cleaner centralised energies,
decentralised renewable energies and efficiency improvements, which
will together provide energy services at least cost.  Several such alternative
studies done across the country indicate that requirement of additional
capacity for power generation can be reduced by as much as 50% of
that reported in the official conventional plan.”  Such information
could prove critical in the discourse on dams in the Northeast, where
state governments like Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur keep
expressing helplessness in response to community opposition to
projects, citing the country’s power needs as one of the major reasons
to build these projects at any cost.
But a more fundamental concern within the region is the internal
debate on whether this dams’ juggernaut really means development
for the region and whether free, prior and informed consent of the
local indigenous people has been obtained before crafting these
development policies.  Over the past few years, as the region has
witnessed major protests over the mushrooming of so many large
dams, it has also had its share of supporters, not only within state
governments, but also some land owners affected by projects who
PRIVATE HYDROPOWER: PUBLIC RESOURCES, PRIVATE PROFITS
By Shripad Dharmadhikary,Manthan Adhyayan Kendra
A large number of the hydropower projects in the Northeast are now being
handed over to the private sector. Privatised hydropower plants not only have
all the problems associated with such projects, like displacement of people
and environmental destruction, but also some other issues of great concern.
The most serious issue is that private hydropower projects are in effect
handing over our common property and public resources of rivers and water to
private companies for private profits. This is further facilitated by India’s new
Hydropower Policy (2008), the first stated aim of which is to induce private
investment in hydropower. Together with the Central Electricity Regulatory
Commission’s tariff orders, it heaps a bonanza of concessions on the private
companies. These include:
1. The determination of tariff by the ‘cost-plus’ approach instead of competitive
bidding. This means that the tariff is set so that all the costs of the company
are met and an assured profit is added to this. This pushes up the risk of
cost padding (exaggeration of actual costs).
2. A 15.5% assured rate of return on equity (investment by owners), and
provision for other bonuses.
3. Private companies are protected against major risks, the burden of
which is passed on to the public at large. In particular, the projects are
fully insulated from hydrological risks for the first 10 years – that is, they
get paid for the full ‘design energy’ generation even when they can’t
generate this energy  due to less water in the river. But when more energy
is generated than the ‘design energy’ due to high water flows, the
company gets to keep all the extra money.
Thus, private players can make assured and large profits with few risks. Meanwhile,
this is likely to push up the cost of the power generated from the projects.
However, the real windfall begins for the companies once they recover
all the costs. India’s new hydropower policy allows developers to sell 40% of
their saleable electricity on a merchant basis. Merchant sales, as opposed to
a long-term Power Purchase Agreement (PPA), allow developers to sell power
at higher prices in the open market.
In the case of hydropower projects, the main component of production
costs is the cost of finance - repayment of borrowed capital - principal and
interest (the full social and environmental costs are often externalised, and
thus not paid for by the projects themselves). After 7-10 years, when full
repayment of capital costs is complete, the cost of generating power can fall
CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE HIMALAYAS AND ADJOINING REGIONS
Scientists have ascertained that average temperatures are rising across
the Himalayan region and the Indian subcontinent. The mean air
temperature of the Himalayan region rose on the average by about 1°C
from the 1970s to the 1990s with sites at higher elevations warming the
most1 . This is about double the average warming of 0.6°C for the
mid-latitudinal northern hemisphere over the same time period2 .
The Tibetan Region, through which the Brahmaputra flows on its
way to India, has undergone considerable warming. In the period
1960-2000, the rate of warming in Tibet was 0.26°C per decade, which
was higher than the global trend (0.03-0.06°C per decade), and the
trend in other parts of China (0.04°C per decade)3 .
The mainstream of the Brahmaputra that is called Siang in Arunachal
Pradesh is known as Yarlung Zangbo (Tsangpo) in Tibet. Chinese scientists
have found that temperature is increasing even more alarmingly in
the Yarlung Zangbo (upper Brahmaputra) river basin. In the period
1971-2003 warming over the Yarlung Zangbo basin was 0.30°C per
decade4 , which is significantly higher than the rate of increase of the
average annual temperature over India (0.22° C per decade)5  in the
same period. Considering the entire Brahmaputra basin there is a clear
increasing trend in temperature at an average rate of 0.06°C per decade6 .
Mean annual precipitation decreased between the 1960s and the
1980s in the Yarlung Zangbo basin, but the same has been increasing
since the 1980s. On an average, annual and seasonal precipitation has
gone up in the upper Brahmaputra basin in the period 1960-2005, at the
rate of 6.75 mm per decade7 .
As a result of increasing mean temperatures in the Himalayas, Tibet
and the upper Brahmaputra basin, snow cover and glaciers are melting
rapidly, bringing irreversible changes to the Himalayan Cryosphere8  and
rivers that are enriched by snowmelt. Himalayan glaciers have been
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look forward to financial compensation. As big business houses get
ready to invest thousands of crores in these hydropower projects,
sharp internal conflicts are increasing. Historian, Dr. Arupjyoti Saikia,
says: “The State Governments’ and a few others are indeed supporting
these proposed investments. But the region’s historical experience of
exploitation of natural resources like land and oil, has led to
apprehensions amongst a large section of people about the possible
detrimental role of this capital - in the form of  ‘hydro dollars’ as it has
often been described by its votaries - towards the larger well being of
the region. Civil society has pointed out that the colonial capital inflow
into the region in the form of tea-plantations could hardly generate
enough economic space where the local people could have participated,
besides locking off huge land resources out of their reach. The same
sharply.  However, in the open market, electricity can fetch a very high price.
Thus, allowing a private company to sell power in the open market can
lead to huge profits.
In the case of a public company, when the cost of generation goes
down in later years, the result is a decrease in the pooled cost of electricity
generation; it can then sell the power at lower tariffs. The benefit thus
goes to the public at large. But in the case of a private developer, this
benefit goes directly to shareholders.
The private companies are also none better at responding to the social
and environmental issues than the public companies. This is clearly shown
in the case of the 400 MW Maheshwar Hydropower project on the Narmada,
promoted by the S.Kumar’s group, where the environmental and
rehabilitation conditions have been blatantly and repeatedly violated,
and the MoEF has had to call for suspension of work.
Private companies are also non-transparent, hiding behind the excuse
of commercial confidentiality. However, in recent times, State
Governments have preferred signing agreements with the private sector
for large hydropower projects as they provide greater flexibility in
negotiating financially lucrative deals as compared to Central PSUs.
The Affected Citizens of Teesta stage a protest in New Delhi in December 2007 during
their marathon satyagraha against the dams juggernaut in Sikkim.
found to be in a state of general retreat since the year 18509 , consistent with
the general warming trend of the earth since the industrial-era began.
Several rivers in Northeast India, including the Brahmaputra (Yarlung
Zangbo), and its tributaries like the Subansiri (Loro Chu), the Manas, and
the Jia Bharali (Kameng), are fed by meltwater from snow and glaciers in the
Tibetan and Himalayan region. 12.3 percent of the Brahmaputra is glacial
meltwater10 .  Glaciers in the Bhutan Himalayas are now retreating at an
average rate of 30-40 m per year11 . In the past 40 years or more, glacial area
in the entire Tibetan Plateau has shrunk by more than 6,606 sq km, with the
retreat being higher since the mid-1980s12 .
The temperature of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau is expected to rise by
2.5°C by the year 2050, resulting in thinning of glaciers and increased
meltwater initially, but culminating in large-scale shrinkage of glaciers,
reduction in meltwater, and eventual disappearance of glaciers13 . Similarly,
over Northeast India, annual mean maximum temperatures are rising at a
rate of 0.11°C per decade, while the annual mean temperatures are also
increasing at a rate of 0.04°C per decade14 .
1 Shrestha, A.B.; Wake, C.P.; Mayewski, P.A. and Dibb J.E. (1999). ‘Maximum
Temperature Trends in the Himalaya and Its Vicinity: An Analysis Based on Temperature
Records from Nepal for the Period 1971–94’. Journal of Climate, 12: 2775-2786.
2 IPCC (2001). Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis. Contribution of Working
Group I to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change [Houghton, J.T.,Y. Ding, D.J. Griggs, M. Noguer, P.J. van der Linden, X. Dai,
K. Maskell, and C.A. Johnson (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 881pp.
3 Du Jun (2001). ‘Change of temperature in Tibetan Plateau from 1961-2000’.
Acta Geographica Sinica, 56(6): 682-690 (in Chinese). Referred in YOU Qinglong
et al. (2007).
4 YOU Qinglong, KANG Shichang, WU Yanhong, YAN Yuping (2007).
‘Climate change over the Yarlung Zangbo River Basin during 1961-2005’.
Journal of Geographical Science, 17(4):409-420. Science China Press,
co-published with Springer.
5 Kothawale, D. R., and Rupa Kumar K. (2005). ‘On the recent changes in
surface temperature trends over India’. Geophysical Research Letters, 32, L18714,
doi:10.1029/2005GL023528.
6 Immerzeel, W. (2008). ‘Historical trends and future predictions of climate variability
in the Brahmaputra basin’. International Journal of Climatology, 28: 243–254.
7 YOU Qinglong et al. (2007). pp. 419.
8 Cryosphere refers collectively to all the areas on the Earth’s surface where water
exists in the solid form either as ice or as snow. Examples are glaciers, snow cover
on mountains, ice floating on sea, ice caps, ice sheets and frozen ground (both
seasonal and permanent).
9 Mayweski P. and Jaschke P. A. (1979). ‘Himalaya and Trans Himalayan glacier
fluctuation since A. D., 1812. Arctic and Alpine Research 11(3):267-287.
10 K. Bongartz1, W.A. Flügel, J. Pechstädt, A. Bartosch, M. Eriksson (2008).
Analysis of climate change trend and possible impacts in the Upper Brahmaputra
River Basin – the BRAHMATWINN Project. Presented in 13th IWRA World Water
Congress 2008, 1-4 September, Montpellier, France. http://
www.worldwatercongress2008.org/resource/authors/abs435_article.pdf
11 WWF brochure on glacier melt entitled ‘Going, going, gone!’ Climate change
and global glacier decline. http://assets.panda.org/downloads/glacierspaper.pdf
as on 06.05.2010
12 Shen Yongping (2005). An Overview of Glaciers, Retreating Glaciers, and Their
Impact in the Tibetan Plateau. Report of Cold and Arid Regions Environmental and
Engineering Research Institute (CAREERI), Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS),
Lanzhou 730000, China
13 Shi Yafeng (2001). Estimation of the water resources affected by climatic
warming and glacier shrinkage before 2050 in west China. Journal of Glaciology
and Geocryology, 23 (4): 333-341.
14 Das, P.J. (2004). Rainfall Regime of Northeast India: A
Hydrometeorological Study with Special Emphasis on the Brahmaputra
Basin. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Gauhati University.
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be a man-made dam on the river further downstream of such a bursting
natural dam, the severity of damage could be many times
higher because of a dam break or the release of excess water from the
dam (a standard practice when the storage capacity is exceeded
due to excessive inflows). This would be true for both storage and
run-of-the-river projects.
The massive floods in western Assam in 2004, that were caused by
water released from the Kurichhu Hydropower Plant (60 MW) in
Bhutan on the Kurichhu river, were in fact triggered by the bursting of
a landslide dam formed on September 10, 2003, on the Tsatischhu
river, a north–easterly flowing tributary of the Kurichhu River ( itself a
tributary of the Manas river that flows through western Assam).  Failure
of the landslide dam on July 10, 2004, released a flood wave that had a
peak discharge of 5900 cubic meter per second at the Kurichhu
Hydropower Plant 35 km downstream23.  Allowed to pass through the
spillways of the dam, the flood waters reached the rivers Manas, Beki
and Hakuwa and caused devastation in Barpeta district of Assam.  Part
of the flooding in the years 2007 and 2008 in western Assam were also
attributed to releases from the Kurichhu dam.
Many of the rapidly retreating glaciers in the Himalayas have
shrinking snouts, that leave glacial lakes behind, allowing water to
accumulate rapidly as snow and ice melts faster. Sudden discharge of
large volumes of water and debris from these lakes causes glacial lake
outburst floods (GLOFs) in valleys downstream.
There are many glacial lakes in the Brahmaputra basin in Tibet and
some of these have the potential to cause GLOFs and create flood havoc
in downstream areas in Arunachal Pradesh and Assam.  Some of the
Himalayan tributaries of the Brahmaputra such as the Manas, the
Sankosh originating in Bhutan and the Teesta passing through Sikkim
also have potentially dangerous lakes in their catchments that could
cause flood disaster in Assam, in the northern part of  West Bengal, and
in Sikkim respectively.  Large dams are being implemented or planned
on all these GLOF prone rivers by Governments of India and Bhutan.
The Mangdechhu hydroelectric Project (720 MW) proposed to be
constructed with help from India on the Mangdechhu, a tributary of
the Manas river24, is prone to be affected by GLOFs since the headstream
region of the river adjoins expanding glacial lakes. The three hydro
projects planned on the Sankosh river (Punatsangchhu in Bhutan), viz.
the Punatsangchhu hydroelectric Project Stage-I (1200 MW) and Stage-
II (990 MW), and the Sankosh Multipurpose Storage Project (4060
MW), may be a cause of aggravated flood hazards in future (both in
Bhutan and Assam), as the upper reaches of one of its tributaries, the
Pho Chhu in Northeast Bhutan, is severely GLOF- affected.
ALTERNATIVES TO LARGE HYDROPOWER DAMS IN A
CHANGING CLIMATE25
There are two options to reduce the risk caused by large
hydropower dams in an era of climate change impacts. The first is
not to go for any large dams in the Himalayan landscape and
alternatively promote micro, mini and small hydropower on a case-
to-case basis. Such projects would have minimum structural
interventions on the river systems, be congenial for the environment,
ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS
Hydropower projects are granted environmental, forest and
wildlife clearances with several conditions imposed on them to supposedly
reduce the environmental and social impacts of these projects. However, a
look at some of the mega-hydropower projects either under construction or
recently completed in the Northeast, shows a rather poor scenario
vis-à-vis compliance.
The 510 MW Teesta V hydroelectric project in Sikkim, commissioned in
2008, has often been touted as being an environmentally benign RoR project
(see box on RoR projects). However, the project was embroiled in an enviro-
legal battle due to indiscriminate dumping of muck and debris in the Teesta
river in violation of environmental laws. In an affidavit submitted to the
Supreme Court appointed Central Empowered Committee in 2007, the Sikkim
Chief Secretary admitted that the power company has “grossly violated the
terms, conditions and guidelines” imposed by the MoEF and has deliberately
dumped excavated material generated from extensive tunneling work “into the
river Teesta obstructing its free flow causing thereby huge damage to the forest
and environment.”  The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India in
a 2008-9 report on Sikkim note about the same project: “Spoils were thrown
along the river banks raising the river bed of the Teesta leading to change in
the flood behaviour of the river, acceleration of toe erosion and degradation
of the overall geo-environmental setting of the area.”
The under-construction 600 MW Kameng hydroelectric project has made
changes in the locations of the Bichom and Tenga dams and the Kimi
powerhouse after getting initial clearances1. No fresh environmental and forest
clearances have been sought by the project, although it is mandatory as per
law to do so.
Several violations of environment and forest laws, as well as Supreme Court
orders, have repeatedly been reported in the past few years in the 2,000 MW
Lower Subansiri hydroelectric project. For example, conditions imposed by the
Supreme Court in April 2004 include:
“(ix) The NHPC will also ensure that there is no siltation
down the Subansiri river during the construction phase…”
“(x) Under no circumstances, the excavated material will be
dumped either in the river or any other part of the National
Park/Sanctuary or the surrounding forests….”
In spite of these conditions, there has been indiscriminate dumping of
muck and debris in the river, repeatedly recorded since 2004. This is a clear
violation of Supreme Court orders, but work has been allowed to continue
business-as-usual. More recently, in September 2010, Assam-based groups
have written to the Environment Minister about other serious violations in
the project. There have been major changes in the design of the project
(e.g. change of underground powerhouse to surface powerhouse, reduction
in depth of foundation from 17 metres to 9 metres), yet the project authority
has not sought fresh environmental clearances as required by law. No
action has been taken by MoEF as of the first week of November 2010 on
this issue.
In the 1750 MW Demwe Lower project in Arunachal Pradesh, forest
land has been illegally used for road construction and labour colonies
before forest clearance has been obtained.
1 Kalpavriksh case study on ‘Compliance and monitoring of
environmental clearance conditions of the Kameng hydroelectric project’,
Arunachal Pradesh (2008). This has also been reported in the CAG
report of 2009 on implementation of 10th Five Year Plan power projects in
the Northeast and East by NEEPCO and NHPC.
Illegal dumping of muck and debris in the Teesta river during the construction of the
now commissioned 510 MW Teesta V project in Sikkim.
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The second option is to develop hydropower technologies that
will not need construction of large dams and will absorb the climatic
uncertainty and associated downstream impacts as well. However,
given that no such technologies appear to be on the horizon, this
option appears very remote in the immediate future.
No policy instrument in India addresses
(even partially) the uncertainties of impacts of
large dams under climate change. Conventional
disaster risk reduction programmes in
downstream areas are pitifully inadequate to
offset the negative impacts of large dams. The
true cost of mitigating the climate-change-
induced risks of large dams will be several times
higher compared to the investment in the
hydro projects themselves. On the other hand,
the success of making the projects ‘climate
proof ’ will be inversely proportional to the scale
and intensity of dam building, given the
emissions from large dam environs and the
compounding uncertainty of risk due to dams.
Perhaps there is no middle path to walk
here. It will not be possible to create a win-win
situation in a business-as-usual scenario
involving construction of more and more large
hydropower projects in the Northeast. Large
appears to be now being done with the region’s water. The compelling
argument being made is that the sudden rush of capital for multiple
mega hydropower projects is another attempt to siphon off resources
from the region which itself  has a small power demand. There appears
to be some truth in this.”
An important element of protests in the region has been the
strong involvement of youth from the Northeast. These young people
certainly want development and economic progress, but they oppose
the kind of development they feel will destroy their cultural and
natural heritage. Tone Mickrow, a young leader from Arunachal
Pradesh, is the General Secretary of the Idu Mishmi Cultural and
Literary Society, the apex body of the Idu Mishmi community. He
says, “Can the Dibang Valley absorb this kind of mega development?
We need power, but these mega dams are not the development we
want locally. We cannot allow such massive destruction of our rivers
and submergence of our lands, which are intricately connected with
our identity. Development activities need to keep in mind the
absorption capacity of the region. We would rather go in for a few
micro, mini and small hydropower projects after careful scrutiny
and full public consent on a case-to-case basis. Such projects would
be relatively benign – they will involve small dams on some of the
tributaries, minor influx of outside labour and will be finished in
short periods. This can help us set-up small-scale enterprises, for
example horticulture-processing based, giving an impetus to the
local economy and providing local employment.”
A banner of the Affected Citizens of Teesta (ACT) during its 900
day satyagraha in 2007-9 against the rush of dams in Sikkim read:
“Meaningful development, not destructive development.” But will
the political economy of large-dam building allow for processes to take
the genuine consent of local communities and debate various options
for local development? The current experience is discouraging. The
Idu Mishmi community has blocked the public hearing for the 3,000
MW Dibang Multipurpose project no less than 10 times because
they have no faith in this process, as a democratic space. Their concerns
appear valid as the government has already accepted 150 crores rupees
as an upfront premium from the project developers and the foundation
stone for the project has been laid – before public consultation processes
being complete and before mandatory clearances being granted.
Despite widespread protests in downstream Assam, no downstream
public consultation has been held to date while taking decisions on
upstream projects.
Where do we go from here? There are several areas of action which
need immediate attention, but the seriousness of the situation demands
that there is a moratorium on dams in the region till fundamental
issues are sorted out. These include:
Ensuring transparency and accountability in decision-making and
governance processes related to these dams at all levels – whether
related to signing MoUs, conducting impact assessment studies or
addressing trans-national issues in these river basins; building in
mechanisms to get the free, prior and informed consent of local
indigenous communities; learning lessons from old projects in the
region such as Ranganadi, Gumti and Loktak; alternative power
planning approaches at the national level; planning for genuine
options-assessment and appropriate development in the ecologically
and geologically fragile, seismically active, politically and culturally
sensitive river basins of the Northeast.
But progress on these fronts will not be possible without a
widespread political debate on these issues within the region. As Akhil
The Khangchendzonga landscape in the Eastern Himalayas in Sikkim is likely to face the brunt of climate change. Major
hydropower development is planned in the region.
and enable communities to fulfil genuine power requirements. This
could be accompanied by an earnest exploration of alternative sources
of new and renewable energy such as solar, wind, geothermal and
biomass. These aspects have never been seriously assessed in the
Northeastern region.
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dams invariably enhance people’s vulnerability and risk in a changing
climate. Given the scientific evidences of large dams contributing to
global warming as well as becoming potential sources of risk due to
climate change, it has become imperative to do proper risk assessment
in a holistic sense for each of the proposed or ongoing projects and
for every river basin in which multiple projects are being planned.
The prevailing development paradigm pegged on large interventions
on natural systems generates considerable risk along with the resources
such as hydropower it creates. The blue print for developing
hydropower by building multiple large dams on the region’s rivers
will increase the risks manifold and is certainly not the answer to
provide climate security to the people of Northeast India.
1 Risk: A risk is the association of the probability of occurrence of a
hazard or disaster with the (economic and financial) losses it would imply.
Risk can be defined as RISK = HAZARD x VULNERABILITY/CAPACITY,
where a ‘Hazard’ can be defined as a potentially damaging physical event,
phenomenon or human activity that may cause the loss of life or injury,
property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental
degradation; a ‘Disaster’ is a serious disruption of the functioning of a
community or a society causing widespread human, material, economic or
environmental losses which exceed the ability of the affected community or
society to cope with the consequences using its own resources; ‘Vulnerability’
refers to a set of conditions and processes resulting from physical, social,
economical and environmental factors, which increase the susceptibility of
a community to the impact of hazards; ‘Capacity’ is a combination of all
the strengths and resources available within a community, society or
organization that can reduce the level of risk, or the effects of a disaster.
2 Rudd, J. W. M.; Harris, R.; Kelly, C. A. and Hecky, R. E. (1993).
‘Are hydroelectric reservoirs significant sources of greenhouse gases?’
Ambio 22:246-248.
3 WCD (2000). Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision
Making. Report of the World Commission on Dams. Earthscan, London.
4 Lima, I. B. T.; Ramos, F. M.; Bambace, L. A. W. and Rosa, R. R. (2007).
Methane Emissions from Large Dams as Renewable Energy Resources: A
Developing Nation Perspective.  Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for
Global Change. 13:2, 193-206, DOI: 10.1007/s11027-007-9086-5
5 Bates, B.C.; Kundzewicz, Z.W.; Wu S. and Palutikof, J.P. (Eds.). (2008).
Climate Change and Water. Technical Paper VI of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Secretariat, Geneva, 210 pp.
6  International Rivers (2008). Dirty Hydro: Dams and Green
House Gas Emissions. Fact Sheet of International Rivers.
http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/dirtyhydro_factsheet_lorez.pdf  as on
18.05.2010.
7 Bates et al.(2008) in end note 5
8 CDM: The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is a process that
allows emission-reduction (or emission removal) projects in developing
countries to earn certified emission reduction (CER) credits, each equivalent
to one tonne of CO
2
. These CERs can be traded and sold, and used by
industrialised countries to meet a part of their emission reduction targets
under the Kyoto Protocol. The mechanism supposedly stimulates sustainable
development and emission reductions, while giving industrialized countries
some flexibility in how they meet their emission reduction limitation targets.
9 DelSontro, T.; McGinnis, D. F.; Sobek, S.; Ostrovsky, I. and Wehrli, B.
(2010). ‘Extreme Methane emissions from a Swiss Hydropower Reservoir:
Contribution from Bubbling Sediments’. Environmental Science &
Technology, 44 (7): 2419 – 2425. DOI: 10.1021/es9031369
10 Kundzewicz, Z.W.; Mata, L.J. ; Arnell, N.W.; Döll, P.; Kabat, P. ; Jiménez,
B.; Miller, K.A.; Oki, T.; Sen Z. and Shiklomanov, I.A. (2007). Freshwater
resources and their management. In ‘Climate Change 2007: Impacts,
CONTESTED WATERS
On August 12, 2010, an hour long debate took place in the
Rajya Sabha on the downstream impacts of dams in the Northeast. The
Environment Minister, Jairam Ramesh, admitted that environmental
decision-making on dams in the region has indeed been insensitive
until now and promised reform. But he also made a pitch for dams on
the Siang1  in Arunachal Pradesh for strategic reasons, to supposedly
strengthen India’s position in future negotiations with China on the
Brahmaputra waters.  While India and China have an Expert Level
Mechanism (ELM) on transboundary rivers since 2007 to share river
flow data and discuss issues, there is no specific treaty on the Brahmaputra
waters. The argument being made by some is that if we build dams on
the Siang we can establish our ‘user rights’ over the river. The water
resources technocracy in the country has also argued that to safeguard
against the impact of possible reduced flows, due to any proposed
diversion of the Brahmaputra waters by the Chinese, we build large
storage reservoirs in upper reaches of major rivers in the Brahmaputra
river basin such as the Subansiri, the Siang and the Lohit to store
monsoon waters.
Responding to the Environment Minister’s arguments, Itanagar-
based civil society organisation, Arunachal Citizens Right (ACR), issued
a public statement in August 2010. Citing ongoing protests against
large dams by communities in the state, ACR argued that making these
large dams a fait accompli is “an affront to the people of Arunachal
Pradesh who remain pawns in the larger energy security policy of the
Government and now in the geo-political relations between India and
China, all without their consent.” Protesting being made “sacrificial
lambs and guinea-pigs”, they argued that: “…India should immediately
explore the possibility of a joint discussion with China on the issue of
riparian rights and water sharing of rivers which flow through both the
countries. On the issue of riparian rights the people of Arunachal
Pradesh will definitely stand by Government of India’s position on
downstream impacts of diversion of river water flow in the upstream of
a river basin. But, that would mean that Government of India should
also recognize the legitimate concerns over downstream impacts of
dams in Arunachal Pradesh voiced by the people of Assam and within
Arunachal itself.”
While it is true that getting China to listen to our perspective on the
Brahmaputra may not necessarily be easy, New Delhi needs to exhaust all
dialogue options, rather than getting into a race with our neighbour and
build unjustifiable mega dams which will undermine the social and
environmental security of the current and future generations of the
Northeast. It clearly seems to be an outdated notion to view ‘user rights’
only in terms of uses created through dams and hydropower. Especially
these days, when traditional uses of water and ecosystem services (benefits
provided by nature to society, including in economic terms) are increasingly
being recognised around the world. It cannot be forgotten that the
Brahmaputra has nourished an entire civilisation. A memorandum against
Brahmaputra dams, sent by 50 Northeastern civil society groups to the
Chinese and Indian governments’ in September 2010, has argued that
those living along the rivers are the first users, defenders and protectors of
this riverine ecosystem.
It also needs to be understood that, in practice, the term ‘user rights’
can at best mean establishing a certain kind of  use of the river which may
help in future negotiations with China on a Brahmaputra-specific
agreement or treaty. It is not a legally enforceable right as per international
law as is being claimed in certain arguments, but a possible bargaining
tool. It could have been legally enforceable only if there was a specific
bilateral or multilateral treaty on the Brahmaputra waters to which both
India and China are signatories. This is not the case until now. It may also
be noted that the United Nations ‘Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses’ was adopted in 1997,
but is yet to be ratified. During voting, China opposed the convention and
India abstained from voting, which is an indicator of the level of legitimacy
the two countries give to this international convention. It also needs to be
understood that the UN Convention, when ratified, will at best be a form
of ‘soft law’. Soft law is not enforceable in courts or tribunals but may help
in the interpretation of existing principles of international law.
The way forward should be to proactively engage China on a one-on-
one dialogue on the Brahmaputra within a framework which seeks to
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Gogoi, of the Krishak Mukti Sangram Samiti, says: “Technical issues are
important. But the dams’ debate in the region cannot be restricted to these
issues alone. It is a matter of our rights over our natural
resources. These resources are being handed over to power companies
and our rivers transformed dramatically by political decisions taken in
New Delhi and within the State Governments of the region. This requires
a political response from people of the region and that will be our focus in the
coming days.”
safeguard the long-term social and environmental security of
the river basin. We certainly need to raise serious concerns about
the ongoing dam plans on the Brahmaputra by China and put
forward a strong case based on the ecological, cultural and
livelihood sustenance the river provides currently to lakhs of
people downstream. Media reports in mid-November 2010
indicate that the Chinese government has started work on the
510 MW Zangmu project, supposedly a RoR project, on the river
upstream. On November 18, 2010, the Chinese government
has defended its decision to build a dam on the Brahmaputra
and said that they have taken “full consideration of the impact
on the downstream area.”
A mere statement of this nature is unacceptable and India
needs to strongly demand an explanation from China on how
downstream issues have been considered as claimed by them.
As explained in other portions of this paper, so-called RoR projects
could also have serious downstream impacts. For example, due
to drastic alteration in natural flow patterns, even if total quantities
of flow remain the same in the downstream over a period of
time. We need to understand case-specific impacts of such
projects (individually and cumulatively) on India and any
complacency on part of our government by blindly accepting
arguments that ‘RoR is environmentally benign’ would be
dangerous. The Indian government could make a bold start by
protecting the Indian portion of the Brahmaputra as a “cultural
and ecological endowment of the people of the region and the
country as a whole”, as demanded by one lakh signatories from
the Northeast in a memorandum sent to the PM on November 2,
2010. This would also give us the moral right to stridently oppose
Chinese dams on the Brahmaputra.
1 The Brahmaputra is called Siang in Arunachal Pradesh
and Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet. The first project being taken up in
the lower reaches of the Siang is the 2,700 MW Lower Siang
project, a RoR cum storage project.
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Change’, M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and
C.E. Hanson, Eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 173-210,
184pp. http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-
chapter3.pdf as on 07.08.2010
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India’. Current Science, 89(5): 794-811.
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17 GLOF: Glacial Lake Outburst Flooding, described later in section
‘Hydro-projects more hazardous due to climate change’, para 4.
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Tibet, China, 2000. Unpublished paper presented in the Regional Workshop
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
Major quarrying operations in the riverine tracts of the Subansiri, downstream of the dam site
of the 2,000 MW Lower Subansiri hydroelectric project. This has disrupted an important corridor
for movement of elephants close to the Assam-Arunachal Pradesh border and led to increased
human-elephant conflict in nearby areas.
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1 The section on Hydropower and Climate Change has been authored
by Partha Jyoti Das (Aaranyak), while the rest of the briefing paper has been
authored by Neeraj Vagholikar (Kalpavriksh). The section on climate change
has liberally used information from credible contemporary scientific research.
It is an attempt to familiarise the common reader with what science says
about the linkage between climate change and dams, in contradiction to
the prevalent perception. It also indicates possible implications of unabated
dam building when climate change is triggering significant changes in the
environment, both predictable and uncertain, in the geo-ecologically fragile
and climatically sensitive Northeast Indian region, by interpreting scientific
results in the given geographical context. The briefing paper has extensively
referred to existing writing/publications by Kalpavriksh members on the
issue in the last ten years which may not necessarily be specifically referenced.
These include: the special issue of the Ecologist Asia magazine on Northeast
dams brought out in January 2003 (guest edited by Kalpavriksh members
Manju Menon, Kanchi Kohli & Neeraj Vagholikar); the Dossier on Large
Dams for Hydropower in Northeast India by Manju Menon and Kanchi
Kohli, and published by South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers & People
(SANDRP) and Kalpavriksh in 2005; extensive writing in the popular media
by Neeraj Vagholikar. Himanshu Thakkar of SANDRP has authored the box
on ‘Dams & Floods’ and Shripad Dharmadhikary of Manthan Adhyayan
Kendra the box on ‘Private sector hydro’.  The paper has a significant focus
on the Brahmaputra river basin and the states of Assam and Arunachal
Pradesh, as this is a major ongoing debate and conflict.
2 Central Electricity Authority, 2001
3 www.biodiversityhotspots.org
4 Goswami, D.C. & Das, P.J., 2003. The Brahmaputra river, India, The
Ecologist Asia, Vol. 11 No. 1 January – March 2003
5 To the present time, all non-Arunachalese, Indian or foreign, require a
permit to enter Arunachal Pradesh. This, along with other legal measures
preventing land transfer to outsiders, has prevented both land alienation
and large scale influx of outside populations in the state. These measures
are generally appreciated by locals as they have allowed them to keep intact
both their political and natural resource-related rights till date.
6 http://www.cag.gov.in/html/cag_reports/sikkim/rep_2009/
civil_chap1.pdf
7 Personal communication with Dr. Gita Bharali, North Eastern Social
Science Research Centre (NESRC). She has studied in detail the impacts of
the Pagladiya and Karbi-Langpi dams in Assam. For detailed information
and statistics on displacement due to development projects and activities in
Northeast India, please contact Dr. Bharali at: gitabharali09@gmail.com
8 Draft fact-sheet on ‘Dams and shifting cultivation’, Kalpavriksh
(upcoming)
9 Note on ‘Socio-economic impacts of big dams in downstream areas
of Assam’ presented by Dr. Chandan Kumar Sharma during the public
consultation on dams in Northeast India on September 10, 2010
10 One cubic metre = 1,000 litres. Therefore, a flow of one cumec (cubic
metre per second) is equal to 1,000 litres/second.
11 The Expert Committee had members from IIT Guwahati, Dibrugarh
University and Gauhati University.
12 With the setting of the National Green Tribunal in October 2010, the
NEAA has now been dissolved.
13 See booklet on ‘Alternative Power Planning’ by Prayas Energy Group
and Kalpavriksh at prayaspune.org/peg
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